I agree, of course, but it seems to me that it’s the term “denial” whose ambiguity has to be resolved in that sentence, rather than “objectification”.

People who are “objectified”, one way or the other, are more likely to be mistreated. But I’m arguing that some mistreatment is motivated specifically by the awareness of someone’s subjectivity as something which can be actively denied, rather than a simple lack of awareness, and so passive denial, of said subjectivity. I’m also arguing that Holly’s aesthetic experience of the tension between subjectivity and objectification is of a kind with the aesthetic motivation for e.g. rape and sadism.

I think that you are right. It does seem like objectification is involved in rape; but I also wonder if the problem isn’t more that rapeist deny their victums subjectivity? Is there a difference between denial of sujectivity and objectification? It seems to me that such a difference is largely dependant upon how these terms are defined.

Though on a different subject, this seems apropos to my latest musings. Thanks for pointing out this post.

If you see a stranger on the street, or on television, you can’t really help but perceive them first as a representation, an object, someone who may be fulfilling some function or role. Even if you can prick yourself into awareness that “oh yes, of course that person is an individual with their own thoughts and feelings,” if you don’t have any awareness of that stuff coming through, it remains a black box. But then you may hear them speak, or watch as they express themselves nonverbally, and you’re struck by an awareness of their subjectivity. In fact, the interplay can be quite beautiful.

She’s right, of course: but this tension between perception of someone’s subjectivity and their objectivity drives not only this seemingly benign aesthetic appreciation, but also many of the atrocities we associate with “objectification”: rape, sadism, etc. While some types of violence may indeed be driven by the pragmatic, technocratic, trivial type of objectification — the kind that actually sees its victim as only an object, and treats him or her as only an obstacle or a tool — these other types of violence depend on exactly the tension that Holly describes between the aggressor’s perception of the victim’s subjectivity and the same aggressor’s choice to pretend as though the victim is solely an object and to treat him or her accordingly. In this sense, sadistic violence (including most rape, I imagine) is a kind of role-playing or make-believe exercise for the aggressor, and it derives its appeal fom exactly the aesthetic tension Holly describes. “I know you are a person, but I will treat you like a thing”: this is the statement made by men who grope women, or rape them, or by men or women who beat women or men or children sadistically. It is a behavior driven by aesthetic considerations just like those Holly describes. These people would not perform the same actions on an actual object — the requisite tension would be absent.

I don’t know what normative conclusions to draw from this, except to keep in mind that the libido — and aesthetic charge, generally — are not exactly socially stabilizing elements.